Events leading up to the coup raise questions that as yet have no convincing answers, especially in relation to any possible US role. Arce suggested this was likely, based on the declared interest of the head of the US Southern Command, General Laura Richardson. In several key meetings in 2022-23, she defined Bolivian, Chilean, and Argentinian lithium and other precious metals as a matter of US national security, and the reason Latin America matters: it ‘has much to offer’ (to private foreign firms and investors, of course) – unless the Chinese and Russians get there first. (Guyanese oil being the other key commodity in the region.)
denied accusations by the Bolivian economy minister, Marcelo Montenegro, to the effect that she was supporting a soft coup by encouraging trucking and transport workers to strike and blockade over a scarcity of dollars and fuel, which Bolivia now imports for albania phone data domestic consumption (because of low levels of investment in plant and maintenance during Morales’s third term, according to Arce). On Monday, 24 June, the Bolivian foreign minister, Celinda Sosa Lunda, complained to Hevia about public statements that embassy staff had made, interfering with Bolivia’s internal political affairs. The same day, General Zúñiga threatened to have Morales arrested should he insist on running for president, for which he is not technically eligible, according to the Arce-friendly Constitutional Court. Fearing that Arce was about to fire him and other officials, Zúñiga staged an uprising, and, from there, tried to improvise a coup.
Arce has declared himself a victim of hybrid warfare, targeted by regular troops, paramilitary or criminal militias, media strategies (fake news, disinformation and distortion) and diplomatic action. There is clear evidence of the first but not the rest. Whatever the truth of the matter, last month’s failed coup highlights three contrasts with the successful coup of 2019 (the first since the early 1980s): first, the lack of articulation between military and political figures, or between branches of the armed forces; second, the depth of animosity and antagonism between the Arce government, which lacks a strong popular constituency, and Morales, who is still able to mobilise sectors of the highland Indigenous peasant movement and the lowland coca growers’ movement; and third, the lack of diplomatic cover or support for a coup from the US and neighbouring countries, especially Brazil, to which Bolivia exports most of its liquid natural gas.